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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's action "failed", within the meaning of U.C.*A. §78-
12-40 (1953), when the trial court actually dismissed the case, not 
when the time to issue process or complete service expired. This 
is how prior Utah cases have calculated the one year re-filing 
period. Because a dismissal for failure to obtain service or issue 
process is not a dismissal on the merits, Plaintiff's action should 
have been dismissed without prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRIOR APPELLATE DECISIONS HAVE CALCULATED 
THE ONE YEAR RE-FILING PERIOD FROM THE 
DATE OF WRITTEN DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION 
A. Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn v. Kirkbride: 
Plaintiff pointed out in his opening brief that Utah appellate 
courts have assumed that the one-year re-filing period runs from 
the date of an order dismissing the case, not from the date when 
service should have been completed. For instance, in Standard Fed. 
Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991), a 
property was foreclosed upon on March 8, 1987. A complaint for a 
deficiency judgment was filed on June 8, 1987, within the three 
1 
month limit. Summons needed to be issued within 120 days/ but was 
not. When it was not, the action was dismissed by written order of 
the trial court on May 2, 1988. 
The plaintiff re-filed on March 13, 1989, which was less than 
one-year from the date of written dismissal, but more than one year 
from the time when the summons should have been issued, which would 
have been October, 1987. If the one year re-filing period ran from 
the last day when summons could have issued, then the bank in 
Standard Federal was untimely in re-filing its action. However, 
the parties, the trial court, and the Utah Supreme Court all 
calculated the one-year ran from the date when the order to dismiss 
was entered; not from the date when the summons should have been 
issued. Thus, the re-filing was timely, and the action was 
remanded for further proceedings. 
Importantly, the Standard Federal lawsuit was governed by the 
same rules regarding issuance or service of summons as this action. 
The date of filing the first Standard Federal action actually pre-
dated the filing of this action by eight months. The same language 
of Rule 4 would have been applicable to both Standard Federal, and 
this action. 
It seems that this should be three months, instead of 120 
days, given the date of filing the complaint, and the fact that the 
120 day service limit did not come into effect until 1989. 
2 
B. Moffitt v. Barr: 
The Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation in the 
case of Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). In Moffitt, the plaintiff's action for assault and battery 
arose on November, 1984. He filed a complaint in February, 1985, 
but this action was not properly served within one year, and was 
dismissed on December 1, 1986.2 Less than one-year after that, the 
action was re-filed, on November 7, 1987. 
The Court of Appeals calculated the one year re-filing period 
from the date the written order was entered, or December 1, 1986. 
If Defendant's theory were correct, the time for service of the 
first complaint would have been not later than March 1, 1986. At 
that point, the complaint would be automatically dismissed, and the 
one year re-filing period would begin. Accordingly, under 
Defendant's theory, the second action would have needed to be filed 
by March 1, 1987. Actually, it was not filed until November 7, 
1987. Again, it was obvious to the Court of Appeals, and both 
parties, that the one year re-filing period began, not upon the 
2
 Moffitt noted that service was defective, but wondered why 
the complaint was dismissed, instead of service being quashed. 
Rule 4(b) required that a complaint which was not properly served 
within one year be dismissed. While improper service could have 
been quashed, that would not have resulted in the complaint being 
dismissed, unless one year had also passed since filing the 
complaint. This is what happened, given the dates set forth in the 
opinion. Thus, the trial court in Moffitt properly dismissed the 
complaint instead of simply quashing service. 
3 
expiration of the time for service, but upon entry of a written 
order for dismissal. Again, Moffitt was governed by the same 
provisions of Rule 4(b) as in the instant case. 
C. Moffitt and Standard Federal Are Not Distinguishable: 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 71 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan 
Assn. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991) by claiming that they 
did not involve the application of Rule 4(b). This is misleading; 
both cases directly involved the application of the savings statute 
in situations where a case was first dismissed under Rule 4(b) for 
failure to issue or serve the summons. Both Moffit and Standard 
Federal calculated the one year re-filing period to run from the 
date of dismissal by written order of the court, not from when Rule 
4(b) required service. If Defendant were correct, neither re-
filing would have been timely. In both these cases, it seemed 
obvious to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court, 
counsel for all parties, and two trial courts, that the re-filing 
period ran from the issuance of a written order of dismissal. 
3
 Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), while not 
involving Rule 4(b), is support by analogy. 
4 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NO LEGITIMATE REASONS WHY RULE 4(b) 
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO OVERRIDE RULE 41 
A. No Prior Appellate Decision Has Allowed Rule 4(b) to Rewrite 
Rule 41, 
Defendant admits that Rule 41 requires a written order for 
dismissal. Instead, he simply asserts that Rule 41 is overridden 
by Rule 4(b). He offers no policy arguments or legal reasons why 
Rule 4(b) should rewrite Rule 41. Defendant's sole basis for 
insisting that Rule 4(b) overrides Rule 41 is to cite Cook v. 
Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 
v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970) , Dennett v. 
Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975), and Valley Asphalt Inc. v. Eldon 
J. Stubbs Const., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986). However, none 
of these cases cited by Defendant discuss how or when an action 
"will be deemed dismissed". None of them suggest that the 
dismissal operates by operation of law, without written order of 
the court. Most importantly, none of these cases discuss when an 
action which "will be deemed dismissed" under Rule 4(b) actually 
"fails" for purposes of the savings statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40 
(1953). 
Actually, Fibreboard simply held that a trial court was 
correct in setting aside a default judgment where the summons was 
not timely issued. It did not say that the action rendered the 
5 
complaint a nullity. Presumably, the Fibreboard plaintiff had one 
year to serve process, measured from the date of affirmance by the 
Supreme Court. Dennett's holding was no broader, merely affirming 
a dismissal for failure to timely serve summons. Cook decided only 
that an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint 
for purposes of service of process. And Defendant admits that 
Valley Asphalt dealt with another provision of Rule 4 relating to 
serving other defendants at a later date. 
Defendant argues that a phrase found in Dennett and Valley 
Asphalt, "is deemed dismissed", is broader than Rule 4(b), which 
merely states that a complaint "will be deemed dismissed". If, in 
fact, Cook, Fibreboard, Dennett and Valley Asphalt intended to 
create a gloss on Rule 4(b) whereby a complaint became a nullity by 
operation of law, it created that gloss without any explanation or 
reasoning to support it. Such a gloss would run counter to the 
express provisions of Rule 41 regarding dismissals, as well as Rule 
12(h) regarding waiver of defenses arising from defective service. 
B. Policy Reasons Why Rule 41 Governs All Dismissals 
Defendant argues that "Fibreboard and Dennett must be 
interpreted to mean that failure to [timely issue or serve summons] 
renders the complaint itself a nullity." Respondent's Brief at 9-
10. Why "must" they be interpreted in that way? Cook, Fibreboard, 
Dennett and Valley Asphalt appear to simply restate the language of 
6 
Rule 4. The use of the phrase "is deemed dismissed" by the Court 
in Valley Asphalt should not be expanded to mean that the complaint 
itself is a nullity, expiring by operation of law without further 
action of the court. Rule 4(b) does not mandate such a result. 
There is no legitimate reason why such a result must, or even 
should follow from Rule 4(b). 
The only reason Defendant can proffer to this Court why Rule 
4(b) is an exception to Rule 41, is that it prevents "litigation of 
stale claims." Respondent's Brief at 14-15. However, Defendant's 
theory could bar claims as soon as one year and three months after 
the cause of action arose, assuming a promptly filed lawsuit, with 
a failure to issue summons within three months. There is actually 
little relationship between Rule 4(b) and litigation of stale 
claims. In any event, the Legislature surely balanced the need to 
bar stale claims against the need to protect litigants' rights to 
a decision on the merits when it passed U.C.A. §78-12-40. 
The injustice that could result if Rule 4(b) were construed to 
automatically dismiss complaints without a written order is 
demonstrated by this action. As happened here, a defect in 
issuance or service of the summons may be raised more than one year 
after it occurs. In the meantime, the statute of limitations may 
have run. The defect may be due to a faulty return of service, by 
misrepresentation of an agent purporting to accept or receive 
7 
process, by a false return of service, by inaction of the 
plaintiff, or through simple inadvertence of counsel. In the 
instant case, Defendant has admitted that at least part of the 
explanation for the delay in service was because he moved out of 
state.4 (R. 162-163). 
On the other hand, an improperly served defendant might 
purposefully delay filing a motion to set aside a defective 
judgment, in order to let the one year re-filing time run. A 
defendant may delay answering the complaint, raise dilatory motions 
under Rule 12, or may purposefully draw attention away from the 
defect by engaging in discovery until one year has run from the 
date when process should have been issued or served. In sum, the 
plaintiff may be completely blameless for the defect, and may even 
be the victim of another's misconduct. If the Defendant is 
correct, a plaintiff may never know there is a problem regarding 
service until after the time to re-file has passed. Was Rule 4(b) 
intended to create such a trap? 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 41 governs; this action will not be dismissed until this 
Court affirms. Prior cases in both the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court have assumed this, and have acted accordingly. The 
4
 Prior Rule 4(b) apparently did not contain any provision 
for extending the time for service. 
8 
cases cited by Defendant do not even discuss Rule 41 or the savings 
statute. Defendant's argument is hyper-technical and unfair, and 
should be rejected. The trial court's dismissal should be 
affirmed, without prejudice. 
DATED this / / day of January, 1993. 
/ 
Daniel F. Bertch 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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